It occurred to me that there may appear to be a contradiction between two positions I’ve previously taken:
“As for the implication that the possibility God may be proven by science in the future is a good reason to believe in Him now, well, anything is possible. It’s possible I’ll sprout wings and learn to fly. But until I do, I’m not going to jump off any tall buildings.”
Contrast this statement with my dismissal of the improbability of spontaneous abiogenesis as a good reason for rejecting a naturalistic explanation of the origin of life. Might not the religious apologist also say, “Sure, anything is possible, but for life to spontaneously arise is so unlikely that I’m going to reject it until proven otherwise. If life didn’t arise spontaneously, it must have been created, which in turn implies a Creator – God. QED. ”
On the face of it, this seems to be a very good argument. But saying God created life leads to the question, “Who/what created God?” The apologist is assuming that God’s existence is more likely than spontaneous abiogenesis. Note that the hypothetical apologist in the above argument can’t say spontaneous abiogenesis is impossible, only that it is extremely improbable. While I don’t really know what the probability is that God exists (or even how to go about calculating the probability of God) I do not accept a priori that God is the more likely of the two explanations. I think that God is, in fact, the less likely option. If spontaneous abiogenesis were impossible, we would be forced to concede that there must be Creator. If it is merely improbable, it may still be more probable than an improbable deity. Still, given that we have no real numbers, I suppose we can agree to disagree.
The above argument aside, the real difference between the two statements is one of epistemology. In the first case (claiming that science may one day prove God, therefore we should now assume He exists) there is no way to distinguish between true and false beliefs. Any belief can be justified, because the chance always exists that some future discovery will show it to be correct. This is not about the probability of a premise being proven true. It is assuming the premise is true because it isn’t impossible that it will be proven true at some point in the future.
In the second case (claiming that the small probability of spontaneous abiogenesis is not in itself a refutation) I am not assuming that because it’s possible, it’s true. I’m merely saying that it’s improbability isn’t in itself proof that it’s false.
In the first case, the apologist is saying, “We have no scientific reason to say this is true, but we may in the future, so accept it as true right now.” In the second case, I’m saying, “We think that this is what happened, we have some evidence that it’s possible, and while it may be improbable it is the best explanation for the facts.”
(I also went on to show that it’s not nearly as improbable as it was made out to be, but that’s beside the point.)
I would attack the premise of the argument of your hypothetical apologist, that spontaneous abiogenesis is extremely improbable. (I assume that "spontaneous" here means either "by natural causes alone" or "without an intelligent cause" rather than "all in an instant.") The premise is not demonstrably false, but it is of indeterminate meaning and dubious significance.
ReplyDeleteAny occurrence or state of affairs can be characterized as improbable if we are granted complete liberty in the specification of the antecedent conditions (as is implied, in this case, by the failure to specify such conditions). For instance, given all the possible courses that the history of the universe could have taken up to this point, it is infinitely improbable that I should be typing these words at this moment. Yet here I am doing it, and I don't expect many theists would see the need to invoke God to explain this banal fact. For a judgment of probability to be a candidate for truth or falsehood, it must have the form, "Given condition A, outcome B is of such and such a degree of probability." So if we take my reading your blog as the given condition and consider my typing some reply or other as the outcome, there is nothing improbable about the event at all.
In the case of abiogenesis, if the initial condition is a detailed specification of the physical conditions of the earth at a particular time (say 4 billion years ago) when there was not yet anything that could be considered "living," and the outcome is the existence of cellular life on earth at some specified later time (say 3 billion years ago), then the probability could be very high. The fact is that we simply do not yet know enough about the history of the planet to make any plausible judgments about the probability of life arising here. We have no very good idea of how to fill in the blank for "physical conditions on earth 4 billion years ago (or whenever)," let alone any basis for estimating the probability of life arising from those conditions.
The theist who says that naturalistic abiogenesis is improbable is not making a judgment of probability that has any basis in knowledge but is merely expressing personal incredulity. It is as if he wanted to make the exclamation "Abiogenesis—hah!" into a premise. The utterance is not false, because it is not even false: it fails to be anything that can be taken seriously as a basis for argument.
Thank you for the analysis.
ReplyDeleteSome probabilities for the formation of proteins were presented in the book, and this is what my apologist was referring to. I should have made that explicit. Though you are right that the probability is much higher than the apologist might think, and in any case we really don’t know enough to calculate any meaningful probabilities.
I don't think it's contradictory. Even if we suppose both arguments are based on incredulity--one towards supernatural explanations, the other towards natural explanations--there is reason to pick between the two. Incredulity towards the supernatural arises from an appreciation that there has never been evidence for anything supernatural, despite many claims of it; from understanding that seeing the supernatural when it is not present is built into our psyche; etc. Supernaturalism is based largely on incredulity towards natural explanations--which itself is often based on ignorance of complex mechanism. Naturalism is not based only on incredulity towards supernatural explanations, but on the positive evidence and experiences we do have. They each have track records, in other words. Moreover, "maybe science will discover God exists" really is out of the blue. "Maybe we will confirm one of the testable theories we have for one particular step in the origins of life", on the other hand, is not.
ReplyDeleteBut I don't even think it's an argument from incredulity to think that science won't prove God exists. As I commented on a previous post, the idea of God is formulated in such a way as to bar any possible evidence or tests. The only comparable situation we could have is a problem towards which we go, "we truly cannot find any natural explanation; it must be God that best explains the data." While it's debatable if we'd hit a wall like that, that still wouldn't be scientific evidence for God--there could always be a natural explanation we cannot understand, and given supernaturalism's track record, that's a pretty rational position to take. (Some philosophers of consciousness believe we can never understand how consciousness works. I disagree with them, but most of them still think it has a physical basis.)
So could we hit that kind of wall? It's conceivable, though I don't think we have any reason for that kind of pessimism, given the explanatory power of the Darwinian algorithm "all the way down and all the way up," as Dennett puts it. And even if we did, I don't think it puts a choice between naturalism and supernaturalism on equal footing, for the reasons I posted above.
It isn’t really about incredulity. It’s more that it occurred to me it appeared that I was dismissing the unlikely possibility of science one day proving God on the one hand and clinging to the unlikely possibility of naturalistic abiogenesis on the other. Aside from the fact that I think the probability of the latter is much greater than that of the former, I wanted to point out that the two cases were not the same. I don’t dismiss the first because it’s improbable, but because it amounts to wishful thinking. It’s saying, “I have absolutely no reason to believe this, but I want to, so I’ll say maybe in the future someone will discover a good reason for believing this and I’ll use that to justify my belief now.” Given that my rejection of it is not because of its improbability, but because we shouldn’t just make stuff up, it’s not a contradiction to accept a theory that is the best explanation we have for something we know is true, even if that theory relies on an improbable event.
ReplyDelete> Naturalism is not based only on incredulity towards supernatural explanations, but on the positive evidence and experiences we do have.
Exactly.
You’re right that it’s hard to investigate God, but that’s mostly because there’s no single definition. If someone came up with a working definition, particularly regarding His interactions with the world, that could be tested and refined. But I don’t see it happening, because whatever the investigation would turn up, people would claim that it didn’t address THEIR God.
Ok. I guess I misunderstood your point about probability at first. Your analysis makes sense.
ReplyDeleteI don't think I'm so convinced about investigating God, though, in any conception that resembles mainstream theological conceptions. There are so many outs in theology, after all: if something goes the right way, it's the hand of God. If not, it's a test. Etc.
Of course, there are studies like the one examining whether prayer on behalf of a sick individual would help recovery. Is that the sort of thing you have in mind?
Yes. The problem with studies like that is obvious, though. Suppose someone does a study where Christians pray to Jesus to heal someone. Do you think Jews will accept it as conclusive? Or Muslims praying to Allah? Hindus praying to Krishna? Of course not! Of course praying to false gods doesn't work!
ReplyDeleteAnd if someone does a study of frum Jews? If was done with a Modern Orthodox shul, chareidim would say it didn't work becuase Modern people aren't sincere. If it was done in a chassidishe shul, misnagdim would say it didn't work becuase it was past the zman. If no one had a problem with the sect, they would blame it on the insincerity of the people davening, or perhaps they didn't have the proper kavana.
And if all that wasn't a problem, they would fall back on the mentalist trick of saying the magic doesn't work in the presence of a skeptic, or claim that God will not allow Himself to be tested.
Still, if we could get everyone to agree on the definition and conditions, it should be possible to test if God is there. I just don't see it happening.
It's a good point, but I would say that it would be problematic even within one sect (or sub-sect). I just don't believe you could ever get them to agree on definite empirical truth conditions that will allow verifiability (i.e. as you say, "claim that God will not allow Himself to be tested"). Could you really avoid "if the experiment doesn't work, it's a nisayon/God has a plan; if it does, it's proof."
ReplyDeleteI think there's one other issue to consider besides the practicality of how religious people would be willing to define God, in terms of what you could actually prove theoretically. Suppose you prove that anonymous praying heals sick people. Will you have proved that a metaphysical God exists? Or will you have just proved the existence of a God equivalent to "the force that makes prayer heal people?" I don't think it's particularly clear what such a test would determine regarding metaphysical conceptions of God.
Reread your original comment on this. If metaphysical concepts of God are dropped, and God becomes a more limited empirically-oriented claim (or, on the opposite extreme, vague enough)--well sure, that could be reconsidered. But that's not really what people mean by it in most mainstream definitions. I suppose that's really my only objection--it's not just that there is disagreement over how the words are used. That's true, but there's also seems to be some pattern linking what people mean, and what people generally mean includes something metaphysical that couldn't be tested.
ReplyDeleteBut by all means, if people want to take on a more testable position, they should go test it. And if they retreat to the more untestable metaphysical definitions, they should not claim it might one day be proven by science.
> Could you really avoid "if the experiment doesn't work, it's a nisayon/God has a plan; if it does, it's proof."
ReplyDeleteGood point. It’s pretty much impossible to pin down something religious that’s falsifiable.
> Or will you have just proved the existence of a God equivalent to "the force that makes prayer heal people?"
Also a good point. You would have to prove each of the parts that make up a particular theory of God.
It occurs to me that people would object to a study that had positive results because it reduces prayer to medication: “Say two kapital Tehillim and call me in the morning.” Once something’s working is scientifically explained, it loses its sense of wonder for many people.
> But that's not really what people mean by it in most mainstream definitions.
I think that most people’s conception of “God” is kind of fuzzy when you go beyond the generalities. (I don’t think I have a concrete definition of “God” either.) As you say, though, most people’s definitions include something that can’t be tested. Maybe the answer to that is if you prove God (of some sort) exists, prove He gave the Torah, and prove that it’s probable He was telling the truth when he wrote it, then maybe we can take His word for what He is. After all, emunah means trust in God, not faith that He exists.
> But by all means, if people want to take on a more testable position, they should go test it. And if they retreat to the more untestable metaphysical definitions, they should not claim it might one day be proven by science.
If I understand you correctly, you’re saying that not only is relying on the possibility that science might one day prove you right a bad way of knowing what’s true, but that if the premise is not falsifiable, it is not amenable to scientific inquiry, and it is therefore IMPOSSIBLE that science will one day show it to be true.
If it’s okay with you, I think I’ll add that to the original post.
>If I understand you correctly, you’re saying that not only is relying on the possibility that science might one day prove you right a bad way of knowing what’s true, but that if the premise is not falsifiable, it is not amenable to scientific inquiry, and it is therefore IMPOSSIBLE that science will one day show it to be true.
ReplyDeleteThat's a good summary of what I was saying, at least about the metaphysical aspects of God--you have gotten me to think that it may not apply to all parts of the ordinary conception of God. Fine by me if you would like to add it to the post.
I think you're right that it's pretty hard to parse apart the concept of God, and to figure out what is testable or not in it. After all, you have the more anthropomorphic conception of God, and then the theological (and more amorphous, less understandable) conception. Some social psychologists actually tried to test which concept religious people used more in daily life. They found that while participants professed the theological concept more, they ended up relying more on the anthropomorphic concept.
I like your suggested methodology for proceeding on the question, though.
Updated the post:
ReplyDeletehttp://2nd-son.blogspot.com/2010/01/search-judaism-critique-part-two-ii_19.html
What I don't understand is why you don't believe that it is impossible for our existence not to have come from something and we can't comprehend that being with our limited faculties? Who is to ever say that our brain will evolve to the point that we will comprehend a God or that there is not a God? Our brain cells are limited in utility. In evolutionary terms our brains should be hardwired not to believe in a God because that would negate the need to feel guilt.
ReplyDelete